Data on contestants' choices in Italian Game Show Affari Tuoi are analysed in a way that separates the effect of risk attitude from that of beliefs concerning the amount of money that will be offered to contestants in future rounds. The importance of belief-formation is confirmed by the estimation of a mixture model which establishes that the vast majority of contestants are forward-looking as opposed to myopic. The most important issue addressed in the paper is what belief function is actually being used by contestants. This function is estimated in an unconstrained way as a component of the choice model, which is estimated using maximum simulated likelihood. Separate identification of the belief function and preferences is possible by virtue of the fact that at a certain stage of the game, beliefs are not relevant, and risk attitude is the sole determinant of choice. The rational expectations hypothesis is tested by comparing the estimated belief function with the "true" offer function which is estimated using data on offers actually made to contestants. We find that there is a significant difference between these two functions, and hence we reject the rational expectations hypothesis. However, when a simpler "rule-of-thumb" structure is assumed for the belief function, we find a correspondence to the function obtained from data on actual offers. Our overall conclusion is that contestants are rational to the extent that they make use of all available relevant information, but are not fully rational because they are not processing the information in an optimal way. The importance of allowing the choice data to convey the belief function without prejudice is emphasised.
Introduction
When an individual is faced with a choice problem under risk, that individual's risk attitude is the principal determinant of their choice. However, this assumes that the payoff from the choice is instantaneous. If the payoff is made at some future date, and the eventual payoff is dependent on the state of the world at that future date, or on some intervention by others, then the individual's beliefs of what will pertain at that future date must enter the decision making process. Obvious examples are found in economics: schooling decisions depend on individuals' beliefs about the structure of the labour market that will pertain several years in the future; firms base their investment and production plans on beliefs about the future evolution of consumer preferences.
Researchers analysing such decisions clearly cannot rely solely on choice data, because any observed choice is usually compatible with many different combinations of risk attitudes and beliefs. This is a problem that is frequently encountered in experimental economics, although not all researchers appear to recognise it or to pay due attention to it.
One notable exception is Manski (2002) , who analyses the problem in the context of an ultimatum game. He emphasises that the proposer's decision depends on their subjective probability distribution of the respondent's possible reactions, and that knowledge of the observed decision alone is insufficient to identify the proposer's decision-making process. In contexts such as this, researchers have tended to appeal to rational expectations theory, and to assume that agents form the same beliefs as would a researcher with access to econometric estimation facilities. This, of course, places structure on agent's beliefs, allowing the researcher to isolate risk attitudes (henceforth "preferences"). However, although many tests of the rational expectations hypothesis appear in the macroeconomics literature (see Attfield et al., 1991) , there is little evidence of whether agents behave according to the rational expectations hypothesis in microeconomic contexts.
An alternative approach, reviewed by Manski (2004) , is to ask individuals directly about their beliefs. Bellemare et al. (2005) follow the same approach, again in the context of an ultimatum game. They find that a model estimated with this information on beliefs incorporated, has higher predictive power than a model based on the assumption of rational expectations. However, belief elicitation can itself cause problems: Rutström and Wilcox (2006) , in an experiment on the repeated matching pennies game, find that agents tend to alter their strategies when asked to state their beliefs about opponents' behaviour.
In recent years, the analysis of data from television game shows has become a popular means of analysing individuals' behaviour under risk. It is obvious why researchers favour this sort of data. Game shows provide a good natural context in which contestants face well-defined decision problems in a ceteris paribus environment. Furthermore, it cannot be denied that contestants have salient incentives, allowing studies using such data to overcome both the Harrison and List (2004) and the Rabin (2000) critiques.
1 One game show that scores particularly highly on these criteria is the Italian show Affari Tuoi, data from which is analysed in this paper. This game is played in many different countries under different names and with slightly different rules. Researchers seem to be in agreement on the usefulness of the resulting data: Bombardini and Trebbi (2007) assert that Affari Tuoi "presents several features that we would have chosen, were we to design such an experiment"; Post et al (2007) describe the Dutch version of the same game as having "such desirable features that it almost appears to be designed to be an economics experiment rather than a TV show".
The rules of Affari Tuoi will be explained in detail in Section 2. For the time being, let us simply recognise that the contestant faces a sequence of choice problems, in which the choice is between an uncertain lottery, and a certain amount offered by the "Banker", and that if the Banker's offer is accepted, the game ends. Many researchers have now realised that, at each stage of the game, a typical contestant is not treating the choice problem as a single isolated task, but is instead forming beliefs of what will happen in future rounds, and using these beliefs in making their decision in the current round. In particular, they are forming an expectation of what the Banker's offer will be in future rounds, should they stay in the game. It is clear that such beliefs have the potential to influence the current decision. It is also clear that this setting bears similar features to that of the ultimatum game considered earlier, with the attendant difficulties in separately identifying preferences and beliefs.
There has been a large volume of recent research analysing data from the various different versions of this game show (see the survey of Andersen at al., 2007) . Much of this research has focussed on the search for the best characterisation of behaviour under risk. Typically, the assumption of rational expectations is implicitly adopted, whereby the inferential problem of predicting the Banker's offer is solved outside the choice model. This is done in a variety of ways, usually based on parametric characterisations (e.g., de Roos and Sarafidis (2006), Deck et al. (2006) and Mulino et al. (2006) ).
In this paper, we treat the formation of beliefs about the Banker's offer as the central focus. In particular, by incorporating a predicted Banker's offer equation into the choice model, we are able to estimate the equation that contestants actually use to form beliefs. We are then able to compare this true belief equation with the equation that would be used under the assumption of rational expectations, hence enabling a formal test of the rational expectations hypothesis.
With these objectives in mind, we note that the game show has a peculiar structure: in the final round of the game, contestants' choices unequivocally reveal information on their risk aversion (since there is no contamination from beliefs about future rounds). Without data from this round, it would be impossible to distinguish between a contestant who is very risk averse but has optimistic beliefs about future offers, and one who is risk-loving but has pessimistic beliefs of future offers. The information on risk attitude extracted from the choice made in the final round is combined with information on choices from earlier rounds in order to identify the parameters of the offer function that is used by contestants in these earlier rounds.
In addition to testing for rational expectations, we provide an assessment of the validity of another assumption that has been made in previous work: that all contestants are forward-looking. While it may seem natural for contestants to base their decisions on their beliefs of what will unfold in future rounds, it is doubtful that every contestant behaves in this way. We would therefore like to allow for a proportion of the population to be forward-looking, and for the remainder to be "myopic", that is, to base their choice solely on the possible outcomes from the current round. This leads us to a "mixture model", of the type estimated in very similar contexts by Conte et al. (2007) and Harrison and Rutström (2007) . One of the parameters in the mixture model is the "mixing proportion" which represents the proportion of the population who are forward-looking. This parameter is estimated along with the preference estimates for both models and the belief estimates for the forward-looking model.
Since a sequence of choices is observed for each contestant, the resulting data set is treated as panel data, and estimation proceeds accordingly. Although much is known about the appropri-ate modelling of panel data, 2 certain technical difficulties arise in panel estimation of non-linear latent models of the type we have here. These problems are addressed using simulation techniques (Gourieroux and Monfort, 1996; Stern, 2000; Train, 2003) . These techniques are chosen in preference to the use of Gauss-Hermite quadrature, which would be prohibitively computationally intensive. Simulation techniques based on random number generators such as the Halton sequence, which is used in this paper, considerably reduce the computational burden of estimation.
In section 2, the rules of Affari Tuoi are explained in detail. Section 3 provides a theoretical analysis of the choice problem perceived by both myopic and forward-looking contestants, and in the latter case discusses the identification problem. Section 4 reports on our analysis of the data on Banker's offers, and obtains the functional forms and fitted equations that are later used in our tests of the rational expectations hypothesis. In Section 5, we construct the log-likelihood function for the choice models, and describe our chosen method for maximising it. Section 6 presents the results from the choice models, and also reports the result of a test of the rational expectations hypothesis. Section 7 reports on the estimation of the choice model with an alternative belief function, which we refer to as the "rule-of-thumb" belief function, and which appears to fit the choice data better than the function assumed in Section 6. Section 8 reports on the results of a mixture model which allows the co-existence of myopic and forward-looking contestants. Section 9 estimates another model of forward-looking behaviour, this time assuming that the belief function for future offers includes a stochastic component. Section 10 concludes.
The game
Affari Tuoi is a 5-round stop-and-go game between a contestant and a Banker. The game starts with 20 contestants, one from each of the 20 Italian regions. They are each randomly assigned a sealed box, containing one of the 20 prizes displayed in Table 1 . The show begins by contestants answering a general knowledge question. The first contestant to answer correctly is selected to play against the Banker. € 500 € 500,000 In each of the 5 rounds, the selected contestant opens a fixed number of boxes (6 in the first round, then groups of 3 boxes); on each occasion that a box is opened the cash value of that box is revealed, indicating a sum of money which is no longer available to the contestant.
Between every two rounds, the Banker makes a proposal: he either offers "the swap", that is, the opportunity to change her box with any of the remaining boxes; or, he offers a definite amount of money to her to quit the game. Throughout the paper, we refer to this definite money amount as the Banker's offer. If the contestant accepts the offer, the game ends; otherwise she proceeds to the next round. If the contestant reaches the final round, and rejects the Banker's offer in this round, she wins the content of the box in her possession. Figure 1 shows, for each round, the number of contestants receiving a Banker's offer and the number of contestants accepting that offer. Figure 2 shows the proportion of contestants accepting the Banker's offer by round. It is calculated by dividing the number of contestant accepting an offer in any round by the number of contestants receiving an offer in that round. This proportion is seen to rise dramatically in the course of the game. Our sample consists of 298 showings, and therefore contains data on 298 contestants' decisions 3 . It actually reduces to 294 contestants, because 4 accept the Banker's offer in the 2 nd round and are consequently discarded from our analysis which only includes data from rounds 3, 4 and 5. Our reasons for restricting attention to decisions made in the last three rounds are as follows: i) offers are rarely accepted in rounds 1 and 2, with the consequence that there is insufficient variability in the data to explain the choice process; ii) we notice that contestants are taking the game less seriously in the first two rounds; in these stages, anything can happen, and 3 For a more detailed description of the data set used in this paper, see Botti et al. (2007) . they prefer to stay in the game whatever the offer is; iii) the audience tend to participate actively in the first two rounds, offering advice to the contestant. In later stages, the audience appear to respect the contestant's choices more, and we therefore feel justified in assuming that decisions made in these rounds are the result of the contestant's own deliberations.
We also focus attention solely on the instances when the Banker makes a monetary offer; we do not analyse the behaviour of contestants when given the opportunity to change their box for one of the other remaining ones. The reason is that we do not consider this to be an informative decision: a rational contestant must be indifferent between swapping and not swapping. 
Modelling choice rules: myopic and forward-looking contestants
In the final stage of the game, the contestant is offered a one-shot choice between participating in a lottery with two equi-probable outcomes (the remaining two prizes), or accepting the final offer made by the Banker. In earlier rounds, a distinction needs to be made between myopic and forward-looking contestants.
If contestant i behaves myopically, she will choose between the lottery and the Banker's offer without taking into account subsequent rounds, and in particular, the prospect of getting a higher offer later on. Such a contestant, in any round t, accepts the Banker's offer if: EU X is the expected utility of the lottery consisting of the prizes remaining in round t.
A forward-looking contestant is one who realises that in any given round other than the final round, they are not evaluating a one-shot lottery, but a sequence of nested lotteries, and the offer in later rounds might be higher (or lower) than the one they currently face. The choice problem is considerably more complex for a forward-looking contestant, because every possible lottery that might be encountered in future rounds needs to be considered. For each of these possible lotteries, an expectation must be formed of the Banker's offer that would be made. Let ( ) ( ),
where ( 
EU X is the value of continuing with the game;
. .
is the expected utility of the future offer; 
EU X
is simply the probability-weighted utility of the two outcomes remaining in round 5.
A problem raised in Section 1 is that a contestant who is highly risk averse but strongly optimistic about future Banker's offers may be indistinguishable from one who is highly risk loving but strongly pessimistic about future offers. We remarked there that in order to overcome this problem, researchers commonly rely on the hypothesis of rational expectations. For example, de Roos and Sarafidis (2006) and Mulino et al. (2006) use data on offers made in all showings in order to form predictive equations for the Banker's offer in each round; then, they use the prediction so obtained as the contestant's belief. Post et al. (2007) do something similar.
In a departure from this convention, this paper recognises that Affari tuoi provides a suitable environment to estimate both preferences and beliefs in the absence of any restrictive assumptions about the way that beliefs are formed, and hence to test whether such beliefs are in fact formed according to rational expectations theory. This is possible because, in round 5, contestants' choices do not involve any belief formation. The contestant's problem in round 5 is just a straightforward choice between two lotteries: one with two equi-probable prizes; the other being a certainty of the Banker's offer. It is only in rounds 3 and 4 that beliefs are formed. Under the reasonable assumption of invariance over time of contestants' preferences, we are therefore able to combine the data from round 5 choices with that from rounds 3 and 4 in order to estimate preferences and beliefs jointly. Of course, in doing this we are making the further identifying assumption that the belief functions are the same for all contestants; in particular, that the belief functions of those who reach round 5 are the same as that of those who accept offers in previous rounds.
An important point is that the distribution of the risk aversion parameter in round 5 is truncated from above, for the obvious reason that the most risk averse contestants are likely leave the game in earlier rounds. This might raise concerns of attrition or selection bias in estimation. This would indeed be a problem if we were estimating preferences using data from only round 5. But the simultaneous use of data from all three rounds enables us to estimate the complete distribution of preferences over the population. It is intuitively helpful to imagine the following sequence, which is repeated until convergence: first, the preferences of the contestants reaching round 5 are estimated; then these contestants' choices in earlier rounds are used to deduce their beliefs; the beliefs thus estimated are extended to contestants who left the game before round 5; finally, the preferences of these other contestants are deduced, filling in the truncated upper tail of the risk attitude distribution. For good measure, we have carried out extensive simulations which establish that, when estimation proceeds on this basis, the estimated distribution of preferences is unbiased.
Modelling the Banker's offer function
The hypothesis of rational expectations implies that contestants are capable of forecasting the Banker's offer in future rounds in the same way as an econometrician with access to estimation algorithms. We therefore use data on Banker's offers from all showings, to estimate the true offer function in each round. The rational expectations hypothesis can then be taken to imply that contestants form beliefs according to the estimated true offer functions.
The key explanatory variable in the determination of the offer is the expected value (EV) of the remaining prizes. Here, and throughout the paper, we measure money amounts in units of €1,000.
Banker's offer in Round 4
Figure 3 shows a scatter of the round 4 offers against EV. A 45 0 -line is super-imposed. The most obvious feature of the scatter is that the offer rises with EV. It is also noticed that the offer is nearly always far below EV. A fanning out effect is also evident, with the variance of offers rising as EV rises. In view of the strong positive skew seen in both variables, it is appropriate to take logarithms before analysing the relationship. Figure 4 shows a scatter of the logged variables. Here we see that the relationship is clearly log-linear. The plot also appears homoscedastic. We therefore estimate the straightforward log-linear regression:
where the 4 subscripts are present since we are restricting attention to round 4. The results from estimation of (4) are: 
We may deduce from this estimated regression equation that contestants who form rational expectations use the following formula for the expected offer in round 4:
Banker's Offer in Round 5 Figure 5 shows offer against expected value for all offers made in round 5. A 45 0 -line is again super-imposed. Again it is also clear that the offer rarely exceeds the expected value. However, a difference from round 4 is that some points appear to be on (or very close to) the 45 0 -line, implying that the offer exactly equals the expected value. We shall treat these observations as upper-censored observations. Note that this censoring tends to arise when the expected value is comparatively low. When the expected value is high, the offer is usually below the expected value. Figure 6 shows the scatter of the logged variables. The censoring that was apparent in figure 5 is even more clearly apparent in figure 6, with a sizable portion of the sample appearing to be on the 45 0 -line.
We estimate the following censored regression model: 
where the 5 subscripts are present since we are restricting attention to round 5. The results from this censored regression model are: 
We deduce the following formula for predicted offer in round 5:
The econometric choice model
In this section we introduce the econometric models used under the assumptions of myopia and forward-looking behaviour. We assume throughout that contestants are expected utility maximisers. We further assume that contestant i has the Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) utility function, given by exp( ) ( )
where x is the outcome and r i is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion for contestant i. We assume, in the spirit of Holt and Laury (2002) , that this coefficient is distributed across the population according to
r N µ σ . Since the utility function is unique up to a monotonic transformation, identification requires that we normalise the utility function to: y U off EU X
Here it ε is a Fechner-type error term (Hey and Orme, 1994) , with
It has the interpretation of a computational error in calculating utilities and expected utilities. This error is assumed to be homoscedastic and uncorrelated with all other variables in the model.
Turning to forward-looking behaviour, let us first assume that the future offer function has a degenerate distribution, so that the error term υ introduced in Section 3 is identically zero, and contestants place a probability of 1 on the event that the future offer equals the expected value of the offer, 
Given this assumption, the latent variable underlying the choice for a forward-looking contestant is
y U off EU X
Let us define the binary variable y it to take the value 1 if contestant i accepts the Banker's offer in round t, and the value -1 otherwise. The relationship between the observable variable y it and the latent variable it y * is then given by:
It is clear that for each contestant, we observe either a sequence of minus-ones (if the contestant never accepts the money offer) or a sequence of minus-ones followed by a plus-one (if the contestant accepts an offer). Let ( ) | it f y θ be the probability of the choice observed for contestant i in round t, conditional on the values of the model's parameters which are assembled in the vector θ θ θ θ. From (14) and (15), this probability is (for forward-looking contestants) given by:
For myopic contestants, the formula is the same but with 
We also allow for the possibility of sub-optimal behaviour, by introducing a tremble parameter, (Moffatt and Peters, 2001 ). This represents the probability that contestants lose concentration and choose completely at random between the two alternatives. With this additional parameter, contestant i's likelihood contribution becomes:
where the vector θ now also includes ω . Since this parameter must satisfy the constraint 1 0 ≤ ≤ ω , the parameter that is in fact estimated is ψ where
of ψ, an estimate of ω is deduced, and a standard error is found using the delta method (Oehlert, 1992) . Other parameters that are constrained, such as ( ) The full sample log-likelihood is given by:
From (19) it is clear that the model we are estimating is closely related to the random effects probit model, a widely used model appropriate for binary panel data (see Verbeek, 2000) .
To understand how the maximum simulated likelihood technique has been applied to this problem, we simply note that but not η i . We can integrate η i out to obtain ( ) (
Following Lerman and Manski (1981) , this integral can be approximated by a sample average of the integrand computed drawing R numbers from a standard normal distribution. This way we obtain an unbiased estimator of the integral in (20), with a variance that goes to zero as R increases.
Estimation of the choice models and a test of rational expectations
In this Section, we separately estimate the two models constructed in the previous section, using the method of maximum simulated likelihood. Our sample consists of 294 players observed making 2.15 choices on average. In each model, integration over i r is performed by simulation using 100 draws for each contestant based on Halton sequences (Train, 2003) . We adopt this procedure in preference to the more commonly used Gauss-Hermite quadrature, since, given the complexity of the model, the computational burden is considerably lower for the former than for the latter. Table 2 presents the estimates for both of the models, myopic and forward-looking, with a CARA specification. 6 Results from the myopic model are presented in the first column. Results from the forward-looking model are divided into two columns. The first of these contains the results of the model estimated with all parameters unconstrained. The second column shows the results obtained with the parameters of the belief functions constrained according to (6) and (9), that is, when contestants are assumed to form rational expectations of the offers in rounds 4 and 5.
As expected, the mean of the risk attitude parameter, r µ , differs significantly between the two models, being of approximately twice the magnitude in the forward-looking model. The significantly positive estimates of r σ vindicate the assumption of varying risk attitude over the population. The Fechner error parameter, ε σ , is also significantly different from zero in two of the three models. However, in the (unconstrained) forward-looking model, it takes a much smaller value and is not significant. This suggests that, after allowing for heterogeneity in the risk aversion parameter, very little measurement error remains to be explained. Finally, the tremble parameter is statistically significant. Its magnitude (in the unconstrained forwardlooking model) indicates that contestants lose concentration on around 4% of occasions. This is in line with estimates obtained elsewhere in the literature (see, for example, Loomes et al., 2002) .
Constraining the parameters of the belief function as done in the final column of Table 2 is in line with the approach of other researchers already cited in Sections 1 and 3. Here, we note that on the evidence of a likelihood ratio test comparing the two columns (χ 2 (4) = 14.24; p = 0.008), there is a significant difference between the parameters actually used by contestants to form beliefs (column 2) and those estimated using all the available information (column 3). This test result amounts to a strong rejection of the rational expectations hypothesis. In particular, the negative estimate of γ 5 in the first column indicates that contestants do not recognise the fact that the fifth round offer is upper censored. (12) and (15) for myopic behaviour, and the model defined in (14) and (15) This result has important implications, namely, that it is invalid to assume that beliefs are formed as if all available information is being efficiently processed, and any model that does so is likely to suffer from bias in the estimation of the risk aversion parameter.
Another question that arises from Table 2 is which of the two models, myopic or forwardlooking, better explains the data. The log-likelihood based Vuong test for non-nested models (Vuong, 1989) finds strong evidence that the forward-looking model with unconstrained beliefs is closer to the true model than the myopic model (Vuong test-statistic = 3.84, p-value = 0.00).
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In Section 8, we estimate a finite mixture model which provides further evidence of the predominance of forward-looking behaviour.
In unreported estimates, we also take into account the possibility that contestants believe they will get a swap (instead of a Banker's offer) in round 4 and/or 5. The results so obtained do not differ significantly from those in Table 2 , for the reason that the estimated probability that contestants assign to a swap is not significantly greater than zero.
A "rule of thumb" belief function
In Section 4, we identified the offer function that best explains the data on all offers. It was with this offer function in mind that we approached the estimation of our choice model in Section 6, since we assumed that contestants formed beliefs using a function with the same structure as the estimated offer function. However, the belief function that best explains the choices of contestants is not necessarily the same as the belief function that best explains actual offers.
In this Section, we address the question of what belief function is actually used by contestants in making their choices.
Our approach to addressing this question consists of trying out different belief functions within the choice model, and using nested and non-nested tests to determine which is best able to explain the choice data. To this end, many different specifications of the belief function have been investigated. We do not report the results from all of these, but we focus on the one that appears to represent actual beliefs most closely. For reasons that will become clear, we refer to this specification as the "rule of thumb" belief function.
Under the "rule of thumb" belief function, contestants use the following very simple formulae to compute their beliefs about future offers: 
That is, they predict the offer in round 4 to be some fixed multiple β 4 of the expected value of the prizes remaining in that round; and they similarly predict the offer in round 5 to be a multiple β 5 of the expected value of prizes remaining in that round. Table 3 contains results from a model based on this assumption. As in Table 2 , the results are divided into two columns: unconstrained estimates; and estimates constrained according to the rational expectations hypothesis. In the first column, we see that β 4 and β 5 are both estimated with high precision, and the estimate of β 5 is significantly larger in magnitude than that of β 4 .
This simply confirms that contestants correctly expect the Banker to become more generous as the game progresses.
The Vuong test-statistic for the null hypothesis that the models in the first column of Table 3 and the second column of Table 2 , are equally close to the true model, against the alternative that the first is closer to the true model, is 7.56 (N(0,1), p-value = 0.00000). Hence we have overwhelming evidence that contestants are forming beliefs using the "rule-of-thumb" belief function in preference to the superior function inferred from the data in Section 4. Log-likelihood -235.54346 -236.52784 Table 3 : Estimates from the model defined in (14), (15) and (21). The utility functional is assumed to be CARA. The estimation technique used is maximum simulated likelihood. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Some of the standard errors have been obtained using the delta method.
The forward-looking model results are divided into two columns: the first is unconstrained; in the second, the parameters β 4 and β 5 are constrained to satisfy the rational expectations hypothesis.
The second column of the table shows the estimates of the model with the parameters β 4 and β 5 constrained to equal the values obtained by performing (external) regressions of actual offer on EV, using the entire data set. We firstly see that the estimates obtained in the unconstrained model are not significantly different from those obtained in the external regressions, which is loosely consistent with the rational expectations hypothesis. We further note that a likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that the parameters exactly equal their external estimates gives the
.53 235.54 1.97 × − = , which is not significant at any reasonable level. We therefore conclude that we have no evidence to reject the hypothesis of rational expectations, under the auxiliary hypothesis of the "rule-of-thumb" belief function.
Figures 7 and 8 present, for rounds 4 and 5 respectively, graphical comparisons between the "rule-of-thumb" belief functions estimated using the model, and those estimated externally using actual offers, data on which is also shown in the graphs. In each case, we see that the estimated belief function is impressively close to the external estimate, providing further evidence in favour of rational expectations with "rule-of-thumb" beliefs. Table 3 . The dashed line represents the OLS prediction of the Banker's offer using the "rule-of-thumb" belief function. Table 3 . The dashed line represents the OLS prediction of the Banker's offer using the "rule-of-thumb" belief function.
A mixture model of myopic and forward-looking behaviour
In Section 6, we found evidence that the forward-looking model is better able to explain the data than the myopic model. However, it is likely that the population consists of some individuals who are forward-looking, and others who are myopic. A model that allows for the co-existence of the two types is a finite mixture model. Such a model is estimated in this Section.
One reason for estimating the mixture model is that it is important to know whether a significant proportion of subjects are myopic. At the end of Section 3, it was explained that self-selection is not an issue since, although the most risk-averse to tend to leave the game early, this does not bias either the risk attitude parameter or the estimates of contestants' beliefs. However, this reasoning only applies if contestants actually have a forward-looking perspective. The presence of myopic contestants in the sample can introduce an attrition bias in the estimation of the forwardlooking model, since these contestants have a higher probability of leaving the game early, ne-glecting the prospect of generous offers in later rounds. Ideally, therefore, we hope for the proportion of myopic subjects to be zero. The parameter π represents the proportion of the population who are of the forward-looking type.
Comparing the estimates of mean risk attitude ( r µ ) for the two types, we note first that myopic types are more risk averse than forward-looking types. We further note that the estimate of r µ for myopic individuals (0.068) is almost six times as large as that estimated on the assumption that all subjects are myopic (0.012; Table 2 above). The explanation for this difference is straightforward: when the myopic model is forced to explain the behaviour of forward-looking individuals, their tendency to reject Banker's offers is interpreted as straightforward risklovingness, and it is inevitable that the estimate of the risk aversion parameter will be very low.
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The estimated standard deviation of risk attitude, r σ , for myopic types, is smaller in the mixture model (0.00074), than in the model assuming all individuals are myopic (0.006; Table 2 , first column). This difference simply reflects the fact that the two types differ quite markedly in their risk attitude, so a model that assumes all individuals are of one type will inevitably overestimate the spread of risk attitude. The estimates obtained in the mixture model of r µ and r σ for forward-looking types are very close to the estimates obtained in the model that assumes that all individuals are forward-looking with "rule-of-thumb" beliefs (Table 3 , second column). This is for the simple reason that the majority of individuals are forward-looking, as indicated by our high estimate of π in the mixture model. The same reasoning applies to the two parameters 4 β and 5 β , whose estimates under the mixture model agree closely with those in Table 3 .
The magnitude of the computational error, as represented by ε σ , is still small in the mixture model, but is significantly smaller for myopic types (0.00004), than in the model that assumes all individuals are myopic (0.037; Table 2 , first column). The reason for this is similar to that advanced above in the context of the parameter r σ .
The tremble probability, ω , is assumed to be the same for both types in the mixture model 9 , and we see that its estimate is very small and insignificant.
The posterior probability of each contestant being of the forward-looking type is computed using Bayes' rule, as follows:
Its distribution over the 294 contestants is shown in Figure 9 . As expected, the majority of contestants have a high posterior probability of being of the forward-looking type.
In unreported work, we also estimate the choice model under the hypothesis that contestants are not fully forward-looking, but look just one-step-ahead. That is, when in round 3 they only consider all the possible lotteries and the consequent offers they might get in round 4. Unfortunately, Affari Tuoi is such that the sequence of rounds is not sufficiently long to capture the difference between the one-step-ahead model and the forward-looking one; these two models predict different behaviour only in round 3. A mixture model has been estimated with these two types, and another model estimated with the myopic model as a third type. These mixture models fail to converge, and we attribute this to the inability of the data to distinguish between the two types of forward-looking behaviour. This is not to say that this is not an interesting research question. We have firmly established that the vast majority of contestants are forward-looking, but it is not clear how far forwardlooking agents are looking ahead. We therefore encourage researchers with access to data from games with more rounds to perform similar analysis to that carried out here, in order to address this important question.
The key conclusion from the analysis in this Section is that it is safe to assume that forwardlooking behaviour prevails. This is a welcome result, since it means that the attrition bias resulting from the presence of myopic contestants in the sample is not likely to be severe.
The forward-looking model with randomness in contestants' beliefs
The models estimated in previous Sections are based on the assumption that the future offer function has a degenerate distribution, that is, that the contestant assigns a probability of one to their prediction of the Banker's offer in future rounds. In this Section, we relax this assumption, by allowing contestants to form a subjective non-degenerate probability distribution of what the offer may be in future rounds. 10 We need to modify the model describing contestants' forwardlooking behaviour to introduce this component of uncertainty in their expectations.
Suppose that the offer function in round t is
and assume that the error term υ has a normal distribution with mean zero and variance
Given the assumption of normality, we can appeal to a well-known result 11 to deduce the expected utility of the offer as: 
We note that the presence of the stochastic term υ in the belief function has the effect of increasing the expected utility of future offers. (25) is simply used in place of (13) Log-likelihood -235.49498 Table 5 : Estimates from the choice model defined in (14) and (15), with the offer function subject to randomness (24). Belief functions are reported above. The utility functional is assumed to be CARA. The estimation technique used is maximum simulated likelihood. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Some of the standard errors have been obtained using the delta method.
The results are presented in Table 5 . These simply show that the introduction of the additional element of randomness has a negligible impact on previous results (cf . Table 3 ). Moreover, the standard deviation of the error term in the offer function, υ σ , is not significantly different from zero. This suggests that contestants appear to assign a probability of one to the event that the Banker's offer will exactly equal their expected offer. If we were asked to make a rough intuitive interpretation of these findings, it would be that there is already enough uncertainty in the following rounds due to the fact that contestants do not know which lottery they will face, that they are reluctant to introduce another dimension of uncertainty to their own decision problem. This idea is also consistent with the finding, discussed at the end of Section 6, of contestants neglecting the probability of being offered a swap in later rounds.
Conclusion
Research using game-show data has not been without criticism. Leaving aside the criticism of non-representativeness of the sample, a concern frequently raised is that contestants are behaving strategically, inferring information on the content of their box from the Banker's behaviour (since it is a known fact that the Banker knows the content of each individual box). In anticipation of this criticism, we have used the offer data to test the hypothesis that the Banker's offer depends positively on the amount that is in the current contestant's box, controlling for the average of the remaining prizes. We find this effect to be positive but very small in magnitude, leading us to conclude that little information can be inferred from the Banker's offer. Bombardini and Trebbi (2007) obtain a similar result using data from the same game. This evidence leads us to conclude that strategic behaviour is not an important issue.
One important conclusion of this paper, established forcefully through the mixture model estimated in Section 8, is that the vast majority of subjects are forward-looking, meaning that they take into account expectations of the Banker's offer in future rounds when making their choice in the current round. This finding confirms the importance of the role of contestants' beliefs, and of discovering how these beliefs are formed.
The econometric problem of estimating the belief function has been the principal focus of the paper. One result (established in Section 9) is that beliefs are deterministic: once a belief has been formed about the Banker's offer in a particular round, the contestant assigns a probability of one to this value. More importantly, we have been interested in whether such beliefs are formed in accordance with the rational expectations hypothesis. In order to test the rational expectations hypothesis, we have compared the belief function estimated within the choice model to the "true" offer function estimated using the complete data set of Banker's offers. A problem with this approach that was not raised earlier is that, in order to implement the assumption of rational expectations, we are implicitly assuming that each contestant has access to the complete set of Banker's offers. The obvious logical problem with this assumption is that contestants cannot possibly know what offers are made in future games; they can only know about offers that have been made previously to their own participation. However, we are following other researchers (e.g. Deck et al., 2006; Mulino et al., 2006; Post et al., 2007) in assuming that all information, including future offers, is available.
In any case, the principal objective of this paper has not been to estimate the rational expectations model, but rather to test the rational expectations hypothesis using a more general model. Our unconstrained model is fully flexible in terms of the parameter values in the belief function, which is estimated within the choice model, and therefore should tell us how beliefs are actually formed, on the basis of information which is actually available to the contestant at the time decisions are made. One of our principal findings has been that, at least in the context of Affari Tuoi, the estimates of the belief function in the unconstrained model do not closely match the estimates of the offer function obtained using sophisticated processing of the offer data. Therefore, constraining the choice model to incorporate the estimated offer function results in biased estimation of the preference parameters.
However, the situation in which we found the belief function to differ from the true offer function was under the assumption of an optimal structure of the offer function, including all of the features, for example upper-censoring, that are apparent in the offer data. When a less elaborate structure is assumed for the belief function, in which it is simply assumed that contestants believe that the offer at a given stage of the game will be a fixed multiple of the expected prize, we find that the belief function estimated within the choice model is not significantly different from that estimated from data on actual offers. We have referred to such beliefs as being determined by the "rule-of-thumb" belief function.
